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Abstract. Next generation networks and service providers are rapidly
evolving in order to satisfy the demands of an increasing number of users.
Nowadays, one of the most relevant research lines in the Heterogeneous
Wireless Access Networks realm is the use of procedures and mecha-
nisms so as to provide intelligence to the network, with the main goal of
optimizing its performance. Furthermore, mobile communication users
are becoming more demanding, and thus it becomes essential for the
providers to be able to offer a competitive value for money. This paper
pursues the objective of obtaining, from an analytical perspective, the
optimum price assignment strategy according to the characteristics of a
particular scenario, analyzing the improvement attained with such opti-
mum pricing policy as compared to a more traditional one. Game theory
techniques, which are gathering the interest within the communications
scientific community, are used for the analysis.
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1 Introduction
In the latest years we have seen a significant evolution of the wireless communica-
tion realm, embracing both the subjacent technologies as well as their operation
and management. In addition, this has come together with an increase of the
user’s degree of responsibility when selecting a network to connect to.
During the early days of telephony, the market was a monopoly. However,
this situation has remarkably evolved and new operators have appeared, turning
the market into a very competitive environment. In such scenario, operators
must compete amongst them in different aspects, such as the services which are
offered to the users, the corresponding Quality of Service (QoS) and/or prices. It
goes without saying that, from the users’ perspective, one of the most significant
elements is the price to be paid. At the time of writing, the most common pricing
policy is the flat-rate, where the user pays a monthly fee in exchange of various
services. However, the emergence of new operators has led to a situation where
churning (i.e. change between operators) needs to be considered. One potential
solution to this problem is to better accomodate the pricing models, so that
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they are more suitable to the new scenarios. In this sense, it is now believed
that modulating the offered price depending on the particular context might be
sensible; it is worth saying that with context we refer to a relatively large number
of aspects, such as the number of operators sharing the same coverage area,
their capacity, number of users demanding connectivity, etc. Another assumption
is that the end-user would select the cheapest alternative1. The main goal is
to increase operators’ benefit while not damaging (or even improving) users’
satisfaction.
Besides, one tool which has recently gained a lot of relevance in the wireless
communication research area is game theory. It is mainly used to analyze the
behavior of different techniques, mechanisms or procedures, when various entities
have conflicting interests and it usually has the goal of obtaining the best-they-
can-do. In this work we propose analyzing (by means of game theory) various
price assignment policies to be used by wireless Access Elements (AEs). We will
obtain the potential strategies which can be established by each of the AEs,
deriving the benefits associated to each of them. From those, we will propose a
non-cooperative game, which will be solved so as to obtain the Nash Equilibrium
Point. Finally, and to demonstrate the benefits of using this optimal strategy, we
will compare the corresponding performances (in terms of the operators’ benefit)
with those which result when the AEs use a naive policy, establishing a fixed
price.
There are some works which have previously addressed (partially) the combi-
nation of pricing, wireless heterogeneous networks and game theory. In [5] Niyato
and Hossain depict various pricing-based situations over networks where only
one wireless technology is available. In addition, they propose two models for
price competition in a heterogeneous scenario, formulating two non-cooperative
games: a simultaneous-play, whose solution is the Nash Equilibrium Point, and
a leader-follower game, which is solved with the Stackelberg equilibrium. The
same authors consider, in [6], the case where providers cooperate, posing a simul-
taneous game and introducing a scheme for revenue sharing between the service
providers, based on a N-person coalition game.
Another approach to tackle the pricing problem is to analyze the situations
from the point of view of the players involved in the game. Using that approach
some works consider both operators and users, while others only focus on the
operators. Illustrative examples of the first group are [7] and [8]. The first one
mainly proposes a theoretical non cooperative game to investigate the conflict be-
tween wireless service providers and users for varying QoS requirements. On the
other hand, the authors of [8] develop a framework to analyze service providers’
strategies to attract users, by offering competitive prices. As a combination of
these two approaches, [2] presents both non-cooperative and cooperative games,
to tackle optimal pricing and network selection, respectively.
1 This is actually a simplification and we could add as well more parameters into the
decision process; however, by limiting this study to price, we will be able to focus
on the impact that these new pricing policies might have on system performance.
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Finally, it is also worth mentioning that there exist other works addressing
pricing policies, but without game theory. Amongst these, we could highlight [1],
where the authors analyze (in general) service management policies, including
pricing, which are used by the operators to maximize their benefit; in addition,
they also analyze various access selection procedures, emphasizing the role of
the price to pay for a connection.
In this context, the most relevant novel contributions of this work can be
summarized as follows.
– Analysis of price strategies where the operators can only establish a discrete
and finite set of fees.
– Deploy heterogeneous network deployments, comprising access elements with
different capacities and coverages.
– Use of discrete load units, bounding the capacity of the access elements, which
can not accept more connections than their available capacity.
– An extensive performance analysis, comprising different scenarios and multiple
instances of them.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents a theoretical analysis,
which aims at modeling the dynamic pricing situation and settles the rationale
for the rest of the paper. The network model and the game which is posed are
depicted in Section III, while Section IV describes how the game was solved.
The achieved results are discussed in Section V, which identifies the benefits
brought about by the optimum strategies. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper, advocating some items which are left for future work.
2 Analysis of Dynamic Pricing Schemes
In this work we consider a network scenario over a squared area where a set of N
AEs, characterized by their capacity and coverage, are deployed. In this environ-
ment, each AE wants to maximize its benefit; this is to say, serve as many users
as possible. In order to achieve this goal, the AEs aim to motivate/encourage
the users to connect to it, even if they have more alternatives.
From the point of view of the users, the motivation to select one of the options
over the others is the corresponding price2. In this sense, users will select the
cheapest alternative, from the available ones. Note that we further assume that
any available connection alternative (provided it has enough capacity) would
fulfil the requested QoS level.
Starting from the previous assumptions, and using a simple scenario, this
section aims at identifying the strategy which each of the operators shall use,
provided that they are aware of the rational behavior of the users, which only
depends on the price offered by the AEs. We will study two different pricing
policies, namely legacy/conventional and novel/dynamic. In the former scheme,
2 Throughout this work we will restrict to situations in which users base their decisions
only on price.
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AEs do not change the offered fee, while in the dynamic policy, AEs are able to
adapt their fees according to the particular context, entailing them to implement
various strategies to attract more users. We will assume two particular scenarios,
whose results could be extended to more complex environments: one in which
there is one traditional AE competing with a novel one and another one in which
two AEs are able to modify their fees.
2.1 Dynamic Vs. Traditional Pricing Policies
First of all, lets assume that the traditional operator establishes a generic and fix
price Pt, while the non-conventional operator is able to settle any price within a
particular set. We can thus define a vector P = {p1, p2, . . . pt−1, pt, . . . pm}, sorted
in ascending order, where pt equals the fee fixed by the traditional operator and
pm is the maximum price allowed by the market. We also suppose that these
prices are per user and connection (this is, they are average prices per service).
The analysis is carried out over the scenario shown in Figure 1, comprising
two AEs, each belonging to any of the two aforementioned operators, with an
overlap area where they try to attract as many users as they can afford. As can
be seen, there exist three different areas: A (only covered by the non conventional
operator), B (covered by the two AE) and C (in which the only access alternative
is the traditional operator); we define uA, uB and uC as the number of users
within each of these areas, respectively. Under these circumstances, the users
who are within the non-overlap areas can be seen as preferred users for the
corresponding operator (the one which covers such area). This assumption is
sensible, since they would surely select such operator (being the only access
alternative).
In this sense, once uA and uC have already connected to the corresponding
AEs, the two operators can offer the rest of their resources, Ct and Cnc for the
traditional and non-conventional operators, respectively, to those users within
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Fig. 1. Scenario used for the analysis.
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the overlap area. Three different situations can be identified, depending on the
available resources for each of the AEs, as depicted below.
1. Ct = Cnc
We will focus on the benefit obtained by the non-conventional operator,
represented in terms of the number of users within area B (uB). In this case,
as can be seen in Figure 2(a), we can further distinguish two possibilities:
– The non-conventional operator assigns a smaller price than the traditional
one (in this analysis we will assume that it sets the maximum fee fulfilling
such requirement, i.e. pt−1. As can be seen in Figure 2(a), the users will
therefore select the non conventional operator and therefore the benefit
equals (uB · pt−1). Furthermore, the maximum achieved benefit will be
bounded by the AE’s capacity, (Cnc · pt−1). In this sense, if the number
of users is greater than the non conventional operator resources, some of
them would select the traditional alternative.
– The non-conventional operator establishes a price higher than pt, (in this
case, it fixes the maximum one, i.e. pm). Since it provides a cheaper alter-
native, users would select the traditional operator, but when its available
resources are fewer than the number of users, the rest of users would choose
the non conventional operator.
The upper line in Figure 2(a) represents the maximum benefit that the non-
conventional operator can obtain for each value of uB. It is worth highlighting
ux, which determines the decision threshold (in the number of users) for
deciding upon the fee to establish. This value is the point on which the two
aforementioned benefits are the same, an can be calculated as follows:
(ux − Ct) · pm = Cnc · pt−1 → ux =
pt−1
pm
· Cnc + Ct (1)
Hence, the intervals and the optimum prices to be used are:
uB < ux ⇒ P = pt−1 (2)
uB > ux ⇒ P = pm (3)
2. Ct < Cnc
As happened before, we can also distinguish two cases, depending on the
point where the benefit functions of the non-conventional operator get the
same value.
– If (ux > Cnc). The analysis is depicted in Figure 2(b) (and is similar to the
one described for the former case) and the intersection point is calculated
as follows.
(ux − Ct) · pm = Cnc · pt−1 ⇒ ux =
pt−1
pm
· Cnc + Ct (4)
– If (ux < Cnc). This case is also shown in Figure 2(c), and the corresponding
intersection point can be derived as follows.
(ux − Ct) · pm = ux · pt−1 ⇒ ux =
Ct · pm
pm − pt−1
(5)
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3. Ct > Cnc
Following a similar analysis as before we can obtain the benefit shown in
Figure 2(d), and the point in which the non-conventional operator shall
shift its strategy (ux) is calculated as follows.
(ux − Ct) · pm = Cnc · pt−1 ⇒ ux =
pt−1
pm
· Cnc + Ct (6)
Bnc(uB) 
Ctpm=Cncpm 
Ctpt-1=Cncpt-1 
Ct=Cnc ux Ct+Cnc 
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Fig. 2. Benefit of the non conventional operator against the number of users in the
overlap area for the different cases
2.2 Two Dynamic Pricing Strategies
In this situation, both operators use dynamic pricing, and we also assume that
none of them knows, a priori, the price which the other one assigns. For the
analysis, we will study the behavior of the operators for all the potential com-
binations of prices, so as to select the one which leads the highest benefit. The
scenario will be the same as the previous one, although we will have additional
assumptions so as to limit the complexity of the analysis.
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– The two AEs have the same capacity.
– We will use three illustrative use cases, depending on the percentage of users
which are within the overall area; in particular we will assume that these are
80%, 50% and 20% of the overall number of users.
For each of the three aforementioned situations we have obtained the benefit for
each of the two AEs as we increase the overall number of users studying two
complementary situations, which are explained below.
– The benefit which is achieved when the two AEs use dynamic pricing, but we
prioritize AE1, forcing AE2 to establish the fee which maximizes AE1 benefit
(Figure 3(a)).
– For comparison purposes we will also assume that AE2 uses a fixed fee, while
AE1 is able to modulate its price, as was discussed in the analysis presented
before (Figure 3(b)).
From the results presented in Figure 3(a) some interesting conclusions can
be derived. First of all, if the overlap area is small, we can see that the benefits
of the two AEs are almost alike. The reason is that becomes more sensible
for both operators to establish the average price and share the users evenly. If
any of the two operators assigns the maximum price, a lower benefit would be
assessed, since users would select the cheapest operator. If the AEs establish the
cheapest fee, this would encourage the users within the overlap area, but globally
it would lead to a lower benefit from those areas where users can only access
one AE. Besides, when the overlap areas is bigger, AE1 obtains a higher benefit.
Furthermore, we can also see that the benefits of both operators get equal only
when the number of users is large enough so as to allow them establishing the
highest fee and get their capacity fully occupied.
On the other hand, Figure 3(b) shows the benefits which were obtained when
one of the operators uses a static fee. Again, if the percentage of users within the
overlap areas is small, the benefits are almost the same. Besides, when the size of
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(a) Two operators with dynamic pricing
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(b) One operator with dynamic pricing
Fig. 3. Overall benefit for AE1 and AE2. Solid markers represent the benefit obtained
by the AE1, while the empty ones are for AE2.
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the overlap area gets higher, we can see that the operator assigning the optimum
strategy gets higher benefits. In this case, since the traditional operator does not
change the established fee, it never uses the highest price and, thus, its benefit
would not equal the one obtained by the dynamic operator, as it happened in
the previous case.
To conclude, it can be said that the dynamic pricing leads to a higher benefit.
As can be seen, a thorough analysis of all the situations might be too complex
to achieve (especially if we increase the number of overlap areas, AEs, etc); in
order to solve these situations we will use game theory techniques, as explained
in the following sections.
3 Network Model and Non Cooperative Game
In this section we bring about a more realistic approach for assessing the benefits
of using dynamic pricing strategies. We consider a square area in which there
exist N access elements, which are characterized by their coverage and capacity,
AE = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Their position within the scenario under analysis will be
done according to two different models: random and deterministic. The position
of AEs and end-users leads to the definition of a set of m areas, result of the
overlapping of the various AEs coverage, Γ = {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
We assume that each AE has a particular capacity, for which a generic and
discrete unit will be used, the so-called Traffic Unit (TU) [3], no matter it
refers to code, sub-carriers, time slots, etc. Anytime an end-user connects to a
particular AE, one of its resources is consumed, and thus they could eventually
get extinguished.
Furthermore, we also need to establish the way an end-user selects an AE,
whenever she has different connection alternatives; in the framework of this work,
we have considered that the users will choose the AE which offers the best price
between the available choices, and if there are various AEs with the same price
the users selects one randomly.
Considering the presented network model, we introduce herewith the non-
cooperative game which will allow the operators to find the optimum price to
impose. It is assumed that the players are the AEs which are deployed within
the scenario and that their strategy spaces will be determined by the various
possibilities they have so as to assign a price from their possibilities; thus, (xi)
j
would represent the prices that the ith AE assigns to all areas under its coverage
in the jth strategy.
Furthermore, the overall set of strategies can be obtained as the cartesian
product of the individual ones (per AE).
X = x1 × x2 × . . .× xN (7)
Hence, we can define a strategy profile3 (s) as an element of the space strategy
3 We will use the words strategy and strategy profile indifferently.
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s ∈ X, s = (s1, s2 ... sN ) with si ∈ xi (8)
For each of the strategy profile, we obtain the benefits for all AEs and, after
that, we can finally pose the finite game to be solved. The corresponding maxi-
mization problem can be strictly set out to maximize the following expression:
Bi =
∑
∀k: i∈k
(bi)k (9)
where (bi)k would be the average expected benefit by the i
th AE in the kth area.
For the specified selecting model, the average number of users selecting an
AE will depend on both the price such AE assigns and the fees fixed by the rest
of AEs. As mentioned before, if various AEs assign the same price and they are
giving coverage at the same area, users will make their choice randomly, so the
AE more likely to be selected is that which has more available resources within
such area 4.
There exits three situations which bring about different benefits, as discussed
below.
1. Case pi < pt ∀ AEt ∈ k
(bi)k =


uk · pi if uk < ri
ri · pi if uk > ri
(10)
where pi and ri are the price assigned and the available resources of AEi,
respectively, and uk are the users deployed in the area k. When AEi has
the lowest price of all the connection alternatives within such area, the users
would select AEi until all its resources are exhausted.
2. Case pi > pt ∀ AEt ∈ k
(bi)k =


(uk − rj) · pi if (uk − rj) < ri,
∑
∀j 6=i: j∈k rj < uk
ri · pi if (uk − rj) > ri,
∑
∀j 6=i: j∈k rj < uk
0 if
∑
∀j 6=i: j∈k rj > uk
(11)
where
∑
∀j 6=i: j∈k is the overall resources from all AEs available in the kth
area with a lower price than AEi. In this case, the price established by AEi
is higher and thus, users would only select it if the resources from the rest
of alternatives is not enough for satisfying all users in the area.
4 We do not assume that AEs are limiting their resources within a particular area,
since this would change the strategy space, by adding another dimension to the
strategy profile, but we refer to the remaining resources once the users within the
single areas (only covered with an AE) have already established their connectivity.
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3. Case pi = min pt ∀ AEt ∈ k
(bi)k =


ri∑
∀j: j∈k rj
· uk · pi if uk <
∑
∀j 6= i : j ∈ k
ri · pi if uk >
∑
∀j: j∈k
(12)
In this case the price of AEi is the minimum one within the area, but there
are more AEs which have establihed such fee. In this case the benefit obtained
(users would select one alternative on a random way) depends on the number
of resources offered by AEi, as compared with those offered by the AEs which
established the same price.
We could also think on a situation merging cases 2 and 3, when two or more
AEs establish the same price, but it is not the minimum amongst those offered
in such area, but the demand can not be satisfied by those access alternatives
(the cheapest AEs).
Once we have obtained the benefits, we can pose the Price Assignment Game
(PAG) as follows, where s is a strategy profile:
PAG = {N,X, {bi(s)}i∈N} (13)
The following definition (see e.g. [9] for a deep treatment of Game Theory),
establish the solution of the corresponding problem.
Definition 1 A strategy profile s is a pure Nash Equilibrium if
bi(si, s−i) ≥ bi(s
′
i, s−i) (14)
for all s′i ∈ S and each player i, where s−i = s1, s2, ...si−1, si+1, ...sn.
4 Implementation
In order to solve the aforementioned problem, two separated phases are fol-
lowed: the first one (getStrategies) establishes the strategy space, sets out
the corresponding game and obtains its Nash Equilibrium, while the second one
(compareStrategies) studies the benefits which are brought about by such op-
timum solution as compared to a situation where the AEs always assign a fixed
price.
Both phases share some common steps, which are briefly described below.
1. Scenario setup. Both AEs and end-users are deployed within the area un-
der analysis. Random as well as deterministic deployments are supported.
For the compareStrategies, only deterministic positioning is used, since
the scenario must be the same as the one which was used during the
getStrategies.
2. Connectivity. Once end-users and AEs are deployed within the scenario, we
establish the existing links between them (whenever an end-user lies within
the coverage area of a particular AE.).
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3. Area establishment. In the framework of this work, an area is defined
by a group of users which might be able to connect to the same group of
AEs. Furthermore we can distinguish between two types of areas: single and
overlap areas; the former group corresponds to those areas where there is
only one reachable AE, while for the second group more than one AE would
be reachable.
After these common procedures, the execution for the getStrategies and
compareStrategies differs.
In the case of the getStrategies we implemented some functions so as to
identify all possible strategies and, afterwards, process them to obtain the benefit
for each AE, with the goal of finding the optimum strategy. The concrete steps
which are undertaken are briefly depicted below.
1. Getting strategies. The first step is to actually obtain the strategy space;
strategies are established for each of the AEs. Each AE will have as many
strategies as prices it can assign. For obtaining our results AEs can impose
three prices but it can be assigned as many prices as we want. Finally, to
find the overall set of strategies, we obtain the combinations which can be
established from the strategies of all AEs applying the cartesian product.
2. Obtain benefits. Once the strategy space has been obtained, we calculate
the average benefit obtained by the AEs for each strategy. For this purpose,
strategies are processed so as to derive the corresponding benefit in each one
of the areas applying equations 10, 11 or 12 depending on the situations.
Finally we accumulate all the benefits over those areas for every AE.
3. Solve the game. In this point, having in mind the strategies and their
benefits, we can already pose a finite game to be solved. The pure Nash
Equilibrium Point (NEP) is obtained with the Gambit software [4].
Regarding the compareStrategies method, the goal is to analyze the ben-
efits which would be obtained by imposing the optimum strategy (i.e. using the
previously found NEP in the getStrategies procedure), comparing them with
those which would be achieved when the AEs use the medium price. In either
of the two cases, we go through all the end-users, who use the aforementioned
connecting decision (until they establish a connection or they do not have any
available possibility). The order in which end-users are processed has a clear
impact on the resulting connectivity, so we randomly shuﬄe them, repeating the
same process for a sufficiently big number of times.
5 Discussion of results
In this section, we present and discuss the results which were obtained by im-
plementing the procedure which was previously depicted. We assume a squared
area (200 m side) in which we deploy 7 different AEs, belonging to three types
of Radio Access Technology (RAT), whose characteristics are shown in Table 1.
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Note that for RAT1 we fix a sufficiently large coverage so as to ensure that it
always cover the complete scenario, no matter the position of the AE is. We
consider two complementary network deployments: deterministic and random;
the topology of the former can be seen in Figure 4(a), while Figure 4(b) shows
an illustrative example of a random deployment.
We increase the number of users from 10% to 200% of the overall network
capacity (i.e. from 7 to 130 users) and for each case we execute 100 independent
analysis (so as to ensure the statistical validity of the results). For the random
deployment, both AEs, as well as end-users’ positions, are changed every time,
while for the deterministic case, it is only the users’ position which changes in
all runs. In all cases we compare the results achieved between the NEP and the
naive strategy (the latter corresponding to the situation in which AEs assign the
medium price).
First, Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the benefit achieved by the whole network.
The better distribution of AEs in the deterministic topology is clearly reflected
in the obtained results, since the benefit by the overall network is always larger
in this case. Comparing both network topologies, we can see that the greater
gain is achieved when the number of users equals the network capacity, being
this difference lower in the edge cases. The gain which the NEP strategy yields
is also more relevant for the deterministic scenario, being around 36% when
Table 1. Types of RAT used during the analysis
RAT Range Capacity # of AEs
ID (m) (TU) in the scenarios
1 full 20 1
2 50 10 3
3 30 5 3
0 50 100 150 2000
50
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RAT1 RAT2 RAT3
(a) Deterministic
0 50 100 150 2000
50
100
150
200
 
 
RAT1 RAT2 RAT3
(b) Random (illustrative example)
Fig. 4. Network topologies used during the analysis.
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Fig. 5. Overall benefit and benefit per RAT type for the two scenarios. Solid markers
are the ones obtained with the NEP strategy, and the empty ones are those corresponding
to the naive assignment.
the offered load (number of users) equals the overall network capacity. Another
interesting aspect is that there is not any particular gain when the offered load
is low (end-users are below 40% of the overall network capacity).
In order to get a better understanding of the differences between the NEP and
the naive strategies, Figures 5(c) and 5(d) depict the benefit for the three RAT
types which are being used (we still use the same two network deployments).
First of all, it is worth highlighting that the highest capable RAT (RAT1) gets
the greater gain after applying the NEP strategy, but for situations in which
users are fewer than the 40% of the network capacity, where the benefit is very
similar (or even slightly worse). Comparing both network topologies, it can be
seen that the results are rather similar for RAT1. On the other hand, for both
RAT2 and RAT3, we can see the consequences of having a better deployment,
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since the gain is, in most cases, higher than the one assessed in the random
scenario.
6 Conclusions
In this work we have proposed a dynamic pricing model to be used by operators
over heterogeneous wireless networks and we have used Game Theory techniques
so as to study the optimum strategies.
In particular, two different analysis have been carried out. On the one hand
we have made a theoretical study about the expected behavior of the system
in some illustrative situations. Since the complexity of the subjacent scenario
might get too high, we have carried out a more realistic analysis so as to corrob-
orate the benefits of using dynamic pricing strategies. For this purpose, we have
posed a finite game, in which the players are the available AEs. The obtained
results show that the use of the optimum strategies (the Nash Equilibrium of the
games) brings about additional revenue to the operators, which would obtain a
higher benefit than that assessed with more traditional policies. Furthermore,
two complementary network deployments were analyzed and it was shown that
the deterministic network deployment yields slightly better results, since it some-
how reflects an optimum distribution of the AEs.
The work presented in this paper sets the basis for a wide range of research
lines, some of them have already started. We will also use another approach, by
means of an event-driven simulator [3] so as to see how the proposed scheme
works when including both user movement and different traffic patterns. Other
analysis types, such as linear programming, can also be followed in future work.
In addition, we could increase the complexity of the pricing policies, by allowing
the AEs to provide differentiated prices per user; besides, the developed frame-
work might be combined with other parameters like resource allocation from the
operators.
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